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Abstract 
 
The question on the art of translation concerns the very essence of 
Hermeneutics, for comprehension is always a way of translating the world of the 
other to whom I am listening or reading. The mythological figure of Hermes will 
lead the way to acknowledge the ambiguities and paradoxes implied in translating 
and, therefore, in hermeneutics. The necessity of keeping at the same time the 
distance and the proximity between our world and the foreign one, has taken us 
to present the idea of commerce as the central activity in every interpretation. On 
the other hand, interpretation implies also a common World-Life (Lebenswelt), 
reconsidering the notion of objectivity, without loosing, however, the linguistic 
dimension of human experience. We will show, in dialogue with Paul Ricoeur, 
how a meditation on translation impacts the very core of an hermeneutical 
philosophy. 
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Introduction 
 
Hermes’ figure is quite interesting in its ambiguity: on the one hand, his mission is to take 
god’s words and messages to human kind; on the other hand, he is incapable of accomplishing 
his task properly. He is, at the same time, faithful to his destiny and a traitor to its own fate. We 
will find this same ambiguity in the figure of the translator, for he is destined to take a certain 
message from an original culture to an-other, knowing that, at the end, his objective is out of his 
range. Traduttore, traditore, as the Italian proverb says. We could establish, without fear, that 
Hermes is the figure of the translator, or, otherwise, that the figure of the translator is that of 
Hermes. This connection between these figures is even stronger if we attend to the paradox of 
translation itself: to translate something is to take it from an original ground to a foreign one 
without loosing its identity – an identity that will always be tied to its origin. We can think this 
movement of eradication and setting in two complementary-contrary ways: or the translator 
takes the reader to the original language of the author, or takes the author to the language of the 
reader. This dilemma of translation – as Friedrich Schleiermacher puts it – is, also, a wider 
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dilemma that hits hermeneutics in its core – and Schleiermacher is also a main thinker of this 
philosophical movement: whether we move forward to the foreign in order to understand him, 
or whether we offer a stranger our hospitality in order to know him, in both cases the paradox 
of the one and the other is unsurpassable. There is not a third term that can measure correctly 
this abyss: the difference between ourselves and the foreign is in-com-mensurable. However, a 
bridge is always standing between strangers, and neighborhood is a latent possibility between 
distant people. And this bridge is built from both shores, in co-laboration, and takes the form 
of a negotiation, that is, a quest for an understanding in which neither of the parts lose more 
than the other, a search for a just price to a priceless treasure. We must not be astonished by 
this bond between hermeneutics and commerce: Hermes himself is the protector of 
businessman, traders and dealers, and also of eloquence and burglars (still hesitating on the 
paradox of this unique figure?). We should examine, then, this commerce of Hermes taking 
Paul Ricoeur’s analyses on translation and thinking how they impact on his general 
understanding of hermeneutics.      
 
II. The translator’s negotiation 
 
Hermes, Greek god that could give hermeneutics his name, is the protector of 
businessmen, traders, dealers, travelers. Its figure is related with the idea of movement, of 
passing through known lands to strange ones. The very idea of translation is that of movement 
– although this term is used generally only in astronomy –  and therefore Hermes is also the 
protector of those who travel by words, that is to say of those who moves from a language to 
another. Hermes himself was one of these language pilgrims, since he was destined to carry 
gods’ words to men. And here we find the other interesting element of this mythological figure: 
he is, at the same time, in charge of communication and incapable of a faithful transmission, 
since he is a stutterer. But, as ironically as it could seem, Hermes is also the protector of 
eloquence: isn’t Greek humor a bit tragic! If the protector of eloquence is a stutterer, and he is 
clumsy when it gets to communication, what is left to us, clumsier creatures? Perhaps, Greek 
wisdom foresaw a paradox in communication itself, in language itself: words are destined to 
communicate men but, at the same time, represents the field of every misunderstanding. Only 
because we can talk, we can misunderstand the words of the other. And we encounter here the 
very heart of hermeneutics. If language lacked of multiple senses, if it is univocal, 
communication should not stumble, and there would be no need for any work of 
interpretation. However, if language is only equivocal, communication could never take place. 
In that tension between absolute clarity – this endless dream of modern rationality, this 
Leibnizian mathesis universalis – and absolute obscurity – this nightmare of Cratyluw – we find 
Hermes and his art, hermeneutics, as the quest for a possible understanding in a field full of 
traps. Hermeneutical movement can only stand in this essential paradox of language and in the 
analogy between comprehension and commerce. 
 
How can we understand communication if is not as a certain do ut des? From the very 
moment that we look to get in communication with another man, we expect that he will also be 
able to respond to our appeal, that he will also obtain a benefit from our encounter. This could 
be taken as an instrumental consideration of language, and certainly it is: this does not mean 
that language is reduced to an instrument, neither to communicate, but it would be stubborn to 
be unaware of this instrumental essence of language (didn’t Wittgenstein and Austin shown us 
this elementary dimension of words?). Even more, historically speaking, most of the cultural 
encounters between men had been mediated by commerce, by a search for a reciprocal benefit 
between people. If a possible benefit wasn’t expected of the other, then we find – at best – 
indifference (in-difference, that is to say, a blindness to difference).  
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Translation, in both senses of physical and linguistic movement, is motivated by a 
profitable benefit from it. Even nowadays, we only translate a text that we consider important, 
that can benefit the reader. Translation, then, is in its core the conditio possibilitatis of every 
exchange, and, at the same time, a consequence of this exchange itself. We could say that 
translation begins at the same time than commerce, that communication between two men is 
contemporary to their reciprocal interest. And we could find here a third element that 
describes Hermes and figures understanding itself: this Greek god was not only the protector of 
travelers and businessmen, and of orators, but also he was a thief, and the protector of burglars. 
Surely, as the author of this paper, he who is reading it could find quite amusing and truthful 
the bond between commerce and burglary (I consider myself most of the times robbed in any 
type of commercial store!), but surely we would be very reluctant to consider a bond between 
communication, or let us say, between translation and robbery. However, not only mythology, 
but also experience, can show us this connection: to translate is to take from the other a 
message in his words to make of one’s own, as the other takes away our words to make them 
his. Interpretation in its wide sense can be understood like this criminal operation, for every 
time I say or write something, the person that hears or reads it take my words from myself and 
make them his: the sense of my message is no longer mine from the moment the other 
appears. In this sense, hermeneutics represents the necessary work of giving and taking in the 
order of language, and there is no need that the words in question are native or foreign: we 
could say that there is an internal and an external translation, since to understand, even in our 
own language, is to make ours the words of the other, that is to say, to bring to our experience 
the experience of the other. Perhaps, that is why in the bottom of every personal encounter 
there is a seminal violence that stands for this incapability to be the other completely, or to 
receive in our own the other-qua-other. We should discuss this problem afterwards. In any 
case, translation, as commerce, can be understood as a two-hands robbery, for none of the two 
parts gains completely, neither none of them loses everything: I take and I am taken... isn’t 
violence at the core of the sentence do ut des? It is as if as we put into agreement a reciprocal 
damage, only if there is also a reciprocal benefit. Understanding cannot take place without 
conflict, and conflict is not but a counterpoint between different interests. Translation, then, is a 
neg-otium: the translator does not look for a pure comprehension of the other, there is no look 
for an otium, a contemplative attitude towards strangeness, but a search of a treasure that, even 
priceless, is given in exchange. And our currency is our own language, we can pay the other’s 
words with our own: isn’t that robbery – or commerce – or communication? 
 
One of the first thinkers of hermeneutics as a philosophical movement, Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, wrote a brief treatise on translation called Über die Verschiedenen Methoden 
des Übersetzens (On the Different Methods of Translating), a writing, as José Ortega y Gasset 
states,
1
 that contains everything that could be said about translation. At the beginning of this 
treatise, Schleiermacher affirms that discourses are “translated” in various ways, as we could see 
everywhere, and that there is also a need to translate “inside” our own language, although he 
will only focus on translation between different languages.
2
 The profession of a translator can be 
found in two different areas, each of those have their own particularities: in the field of 
business, of commerce, and the real translator, that will work in the fields of science and arts. 
This distinction receives, also, two different terms to those who are involve in each area: 
interpreter is the one that works in the field of business, and translator – rigorously speaking – 
the one that inhabits the world of science and arts. While the interpreter is close to the objects 
of negotiation, due to the way commerce takes place, the translator finds himself in front of the 
spiritual and axiological world that lives in the core of language. In the first case, objectivity 
prevails over words, while in the second case, language prevails over the object at stake. This is 
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why translators must know deeply the author’s life and the cultural and spiritual background of 
the language he is translating. Interpreter, otherwise, turns his attention to the object that is in 
the center of negotiation, for commercial activities have a certain arithmetic and geometrical 
character, and translation therefore is made almost mechanically.
3
 Whereas “interpretation” – 
in this particular sense – is moved by the will of possession, that is to say, the needs of the  
object itself, translation confronts the products of art and science, and tries to “transplant” them 
from a language to the other, for it is moved by a spiritual imperative.
4
 In this matter, we must 
consider two things: on the one hand, that where ideas – that identifies with linguistic 
expression – prevails over objectivity, for which the word is only an arbitrary sign, there is no 
unique correlation between words in different languages. On the other hand, when someone 
thinks more or less independently and wants to express himself, he is confronted with language 
in a twofold sense: “in a sense, we dominate the language we speak; ourselves and all our 
thoughts are products of language. (...) However, in another sense, everyone who thinks freely, 
and whose spirit acts on his own impulse, contributes also to mold language”.5 This is why 
creative works (that appears in both areas of science and arts) must be understood from this 
double dimension of the foreign language and the author’s life that generates new moments on 
language itself. Translation, then, seems a hare-brained enterprise, for the translator has to 
penetrate the spirit of the language molded by the author in an original way, foreseeing his 
peculiar way of thinking and sensing, and must communicate this knowledge to his readers 
offering his own language and his own limited knowledge of the author he is translating. In this 
hopeless project, Schleiermacher remarks that two different methods were proposed, 
paraphrases and imitations: the first one tries to expel language’s irrationality, reproducing the 
content with a limited exactness, renouncing to the impression of the words themselves, for the 
lived discourse stays irreparably dead; the second one, instead, is dominated by the irrationality 
of language, trying to get close to the impression that words produce in the reader, but 
renouncing to the identity of the original work. While paraphrases are often used in the field of 
science, imitations are use in the one of arts. However, neither of both procedures satisfies the 
authentic translator.
6
 Schleiermacher, therefore, reduces translation to a unique crossroad: “Or 
the translator leaves the writer as quiet as possible and makes the reader go to his encounter, or 
he leaves the reader as easy as possible and makes the writer go to his encounter”.7 
 
Schleiermacher’s treatise keeps on analyzing the problems and difficulties, as the benefits 
of each method of translation. However, we do not want to center our reflection on his treatise, 
but to resume his confrontation between the interpreter and the translator, and in the 
counterpoint between the two possibilities of translating. We will start from the former, and go 
back then to the latter. If we notice the counterpoint between taking the reader to the writer or 
the other way round, we shall acknowledge that none of these two methods can be pass through 
completely, for in that case translation itself would be unnecessary – and Schleiermacher 
acknowledges this problem. If the author is driven completely to the reader in translation, then 
the translated work would be exactly as if the author wrote his work in the mother-tongue of the 
reader; if the reader is taken forward the writer completely, then a translation would be vain, for 
the reader could face the original work as if it were written in his language. However, the task of 
translation is to make real this recreation of the as if, for a perfect understanding would imply 
this absolute trans-lation of foreign to homeland, or from here to there. This is why translation 
is, in its heart, a ridiculous enterprise, an impossible one. If the reciprocal strange character of 
both the reader and the writer is irreducible, then translation must find a certain medium where 
both can understand each other at a just price. For, if the reader is brought completely to the 
author, the original work will show all his linguistic power but at the price of being illegible for 
the reader; if the writer is taken completely to the reader, then the work will be legible by 
foreign but will lose all of its originality and linguistic richness. There must be a fair trade... 
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although justice is unrealizable. Commercial strategies will, then, take place – and commerce is 
a way of robbery. A part of the treasure of original work will be taken by the reader, as a part of 
the reader’s world will be taken by the hands of the foreign language. None of the parts 
involved will stay unharmed, and the translator – playing both the role of judge and lawyer, but 
also of the businessman and the burglar – will estipulate the damage for each of them, taking 
from and giving away a priceless merchandise: language. 
 
Concerning the other Schleiermacher’s contraposition between the interpreter and the 
translator, we must remark some difficulties. Although the difference between a poetic or 
scientific work and a commercial conversation is conclusive, the relationship between objects 
and words is not that clear. Even in commercial relations, words still sign the objects at stake, so 
as in poetry the worldly objects still stand in front of the words. Phenomenologically speaking, 
we could trace this tension to the problem of the Lebenswelt: is there a unique world, or is 
there multiple worlds? Leaving behind the illusion of an objective world – such as the one of 
geometrical discourse – a world that is not pierced by language, the question for the objective 
dimension of language catch the attention of hermeneutical thinkers, and it represents, 
ultimately, the main problem of hermeneutics. Without attempting to solve this tension – 
hermeneutically unsolvable – we can affirm that if language prevails completely over objectivity, 
then there would be as many worlds as languages exists, and therefore, no translation would be 
possible, for such a diversity wouldn’t find a common field to get close; at the same time, if 
objectivity prevailed completely over language, then the diversity of languages and cultures 
would be only illusory, and understanding would be a starting point, not a goal, and therefore, 
translation would turn unnecessary. If this is so, then all interpreters – using Schleiermacher 
terms – are also translators, as every translator is also an interpreter. Objectivity cannot be 
exiled from translation, and, therefore, translators must negotiate with poetical and scientific 
works such as businessmen do with gold and spices. But also language cannot be unknown in 
the heart of objects, for interpreters must give up to the possibility of a fair trade, of a fair price, 
and acknowledge the excess of sense in words that is irreducible to objectivity. The tension and 
paradox of Hermes’ figure stands again. Concluding, translation is a way of trading the 
priceless, of transferring the non-transferrable.  
 
III. L’intraduisible: the “Other” question 
 
We might bring a central question concerning translation: what place does the translator 
occupy? As we said, the translator is, in a way, a businessman that looks for the best negotiation 
possible. However, for whom does he work? Although Schleiermacher’s alternative sheds light 
on the ways of the translator, we must underline that the translator belongs primarily to only 
one bank of the river, that of his mother-tongue. Nevertheless, the translator is that who builds 
a bridge to the other side – and this engineering must be helped from the other shore as well, 
but only on the demands of the translator’s side – that is to say, a mediator. Paul Ricoeur8 
affirms that translator is he who carries a message, he who is in the middle of two strangers, the 
reader and the writer, and so he mediates between them. But is he so? Bringing Antoine 
Berman and Franz Rosenzweig into question, and taking Schleiermacher’s alternative, Ricoeur 
considers the translator as a server of two masters (Rosenzweig paradox). In this sense, Ricoeur 
offers a double psychological analogy to understand translation: with the work of rememoration 
and with the work of grief. On the one hand, translation charges against consecration of 
mother-tongue, against its intolerance towards what it is not its identity; but also this resistance 
(Ricoeur’s psychoanalytical terms are eloquent) is also strong in the other-tongue, in the foreign 
language under the presumption of non-translatability, presumption that makes of translation a 
drama and of the will of a good translation a challenge (and that’s why there is an urge to re-
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translate, fed by dissatisfaction towards existing translations). On the other hand, taking now the 
analogy with the work of grief, Ricouer finds its equivalent in the renounce of the ideal of a 
perfect translation, renounce that makes possible to live the impossibility of serving two masters 
at the same time and to assume the problematics of fidelity and treason. However, this search 
for an absolute translation governs the enterprise of a continuous approximation to this ideal, 
for this dream of a perfect translation has not been entirely deceitful, since it has moved the 
ambition to show the hidden side of the foreign language, and reciprocally, the ambition to de-
provincialize the mother-tongue, inviting it to think itself as a language among others and, 
ultimately, “à se percevoir elle-même comme étrangère”.9 At the same time, this will is also 
marked by other figures: the cosmopolitan desire to build the book, that is, the dream of an 
omni-translation, and the messianic hope (as Walter Benjamin describes in his work, “The 
translator’s task”) of a pure language that every translation carries in it a messianic echo. Under 
this figures, states Ricoeur, perfect translation is equivalent to a profit without losses. That’s why 
translation must grieve on these loses, and must accept the unsurpassable difference between 
one and the other, between our own reign and fo-reign.
10
 Ricoeur, then, affirms that universality 
would imply to turn everyone a stranger, an erratic nomad, without any mother-tongue. But 
also this grief means the translator’s happiness when he accepts the distance between adequacy 
and equivalence, being translation “l’équivalence sans adéquation”.11 
 
En avouant et en assumant l’irréductibilité de la paire du propre et de l’étranger, 
le traducteur trouve sa récompense dans la reconnaissance du statut indépassable 
de dialogicité de l’acte de traduire comme l’horizon raisonnable du désir de 
traduire. En dépit de l’agonistique qui dramatise la tâche du traducteur, celui-ci 
peut trouver son bonheur dans ce que j’aimerais appeler l’hospitalité langagière. 
(...) Hospitalité langagière donc, où le plaisir d’habiter la langue de l’autre est 
compensé par le plaisir de recevoir chez soi, dans sa propre demeure d’accueil, la 
parole de l’étranger.12   
          
The experience of translation, then, can be understood in analogy with the experience of 
hospitality. To receive someone in our own house implies to consider the other as other, but 
also to consider him as ourselves, for we treat him as our brother, as an integrant of our home. 
At the same time, the other feels as a stranger in our house, but, at the same time, he feels at 
home; don’t we invite our visitors to feel as if they were at home? The idea of hospitality is 
central in Paul Ricoeur’s work, and it is possible that this idea is a fundamental heritage of his 
friend and teacher, Gabriel Marcel.
13
 The centrality of this idea, I think, concerns the respect 
for alterity and selfhood in the experience of encounter: in hospitality, neither one nor the 
other alienates themselves completely, but at the same time, neither of them stays the same. 
One of Marcel’s main notions is that of participation, and we understand hospitality as a form 
of participation, for the reality of encounter surpass the reality of each of the participants, and 
this excess transfigures the parts involved and takes them to a more plenary way of being. In 
other words, only in the encounter of alterities, selfhood can embrace its essence. But there is 
no primacy neither of alterity nor of selfhood: the primary reality is that of encounter in itself, 
that is to say, the We is more original than the I or the Thou.
14
 Although we don’t find a 
metaphysical statement as this one in Ricoeur’s work, we can surely detect its ultimate 
concordance: hermeneutics are possible only if dialogue prevails over monologues, only if 
horizons merge each other. There could not be an hermeneutical work – and translation is a 
figure of hermeneutics – if alterity were absolute, if we talk of an Absolute Other; neither we 
could understand hermeneutics if we not affirm the possibility of the Self to be an-other.   
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If this is so, then l’intraduisible only stands for an absolute alterity, and hermeneutical 
project would suppose – at least as a possibility – that everything could be translated. But we 
would be misunderstanding hermeneutics if we understand translation as alteration or 
assimilation: translation would be, in the best case, encounter. Perhaps we can get near the 
dynamics of language if we presuppose this hypothesis, for languages in their own core are 
transformed in the contact with foreign, and translation is not literal sometimes, but takes place 
as new ways in which a strange word or expression is included in our mother-tongue. In 
translation, both languages encounter each other and transforms themselves in this 
participation, in their being chez toi. Perhaps if we follow this lead of a “linguistic hospitality”, 
we could understand that translation does not mean to bring everything strange to our own, nor 
to take our own to the foreign; linguistic hospitality could mean that any language, in spite of 
their strangeness, can encounter with another, and that the shadow of l’intraduisible is only a 
moment in the way to understanding. However, we should be careful of falling into the illusion 
of absolute universality: as Ricoeur said, this universality would only mean that we are all 
strangers, or that differences are overwhelmed.
15
 The utopia of an absolute understanding, or of 
an ultimate fusion of horizons, must be kept only as utopia. José Ortega y Gasset claimed,
16
 
concerning translation, that there are two different utopic ways of thinking: an authentic one, 
and an un-authentic one, being the latter the utopia that conceives as possible its own 
realization, while the former is thoroughly aware of its impossibility to become real. This is the 
utopic manner of thinking of hermeneutics, that which stands for universal translation as far as 
it avoids univocal thinking, a logical mathesis universalis that would reduce diversity to a vow 
unity; but also as far as it avoids equivocal thinking, that would spread meaning to infinity, and 
would make of difference in itself an in-significant term. Perhaps, hermeneutics should turn to 
analogy and give it a new meaning, understand it from a new point of depart. 
 
Ricoeur addresses this question of l’intraduisible in an unpublished paper which title is 
very suggesting: Un passage, traduire l’intraduisible.17 There are two elements of astonishment: 
first, the image of a passage, that is to say, translation would be as a step from a known place to 
an unknown one, from our homeland to foreign lands. Secondly, the paradox expressed in the 
subtitle: to translate that which can not be translated, that is to say, at the same time, that there 
is something that isn’t translatable, and that it can be translated. We can find the hermeneutical 
utopic thinking in this paradox, for translating the non-translatable will be forever a task, and no 
translation will ever overcome the non-translatable. Ricoeur starts claiming that the non-
translatable is, in the first place, the languages as far as they are plural, that is to say, as far as 
their differences affects every operational level (phonetical, lexical, syntactical, discursive); 
moreover, this differences between languages are expressions of a difference in their 
Weltanschauung, in their particular way to express their vision of the world. This peculiarity is 
not found in any word, sentence or paragraph, but in texts, that as totality of meaning embrace 
the other semantical terms.
18
 This is why, for Ricoeur, the task of translation must not move 
from the word to the sentence, and then to the text, and then to cultural ground, but instead 
must move the other way around: “s’imprégnant par de vastes lectures de l’esprit d’une culture, 
le traducteur redescend du texte, a la phrase et au mot”.19 In the second place, there is not only 
an initial non-translatable, but a terminal one as well, for translation exists, and expresses the 
will to know the foreign (that feeds the desire of translation, formula that Ricoeur takes from 
Antoine Berman). In his doing, the translator overcomes the theoretical objection of a non-
translatability from a tongue to an other; making translations is a practical response to this 
principle, whose more powerful argument is that of the relation between a certain language and 
the mystery, the secrecy, the hidden, the incommunicable.
20
 Nevertheless, translations are not 
only possible, but real. How does the translator effectively translate? For Ricoeur, translation is 
a practice in search of its theory, and instead of giving up in front of the translatable/non-
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translatable dilemma, we should think in the loyalty/treason opposition, taking into account that 
translation is always a risky operation. The “terminal non-translatable” is revealed and even 
produced by translation itself. The loyalty/treason dilemma is a practical one – not a theoretical 
as the other – because it is not possible to find an absolute criteria of what would be a good 
translation. This criteria would be the absurd postulation of a third textual element that 
communicates the other two, the original and the translation. This is why there is a paradox in 
the core of translation, for “une bonne traduction ne peut viser qu’a une équivalence 
présumée, non fondée dans une identité de sens démontrable, une équivalence sans identité”.21 
Translation work takes the form, then, of a re-translation work, of a revision of past 
translations. In order to explain this “equivalence without identity”, Ricoeur takes the notion of 
a “constructive comparatisme” from Marcel Détienne. Translation should be a way to 
“construct comparatives”: 
 
Grandeur de la traduction, risque de la traduction: trahison créatrice de l’original, 
appropriation également créatrice par la langue d’accueil; construction du 
comparable.
22
 
 
Both of these heterogeneous masters are brought together in comparison due to the 
translation-construction work: a double treason has taken place, writes Ricoeur. But there is still 
a third non-translatable, the last one, that we find with the lead of the construction of the 
comparable, construction that is made in the level of sense. The problem with sense is that its 
united deeply with the flesh of words, with letters: translation can not be satisfied with a 
translation concerning sense only... for there is an indestructible unity between sense and 
sound, between significance and sign. This is a terrible issue concerning poetry, mainly, and we 
can see in Ricoeur’s approach a similarity with Schleiermacher’s difference between 
paraphrasis and imitation.  
 
Ricoeur leaves this paper open, without any solution, how it must be... But we could 
synthesis his position stating that there is translation because we find a stranger, and that 
translation is not possible because there is a stranger in front of us. This paradox, 
unsurpassable in the level of theory, is surpassed in the level of practice, but only if we accept 
that this surpassing is not an absolute one, only if we remain in the core of the difference 
between oneself and the other. The Other question is, then, forever a question, but a question 
that we address continuously, that we respond to once and again...  
 
IV. Hermeneutics and the paradigm of translation as linguistic hospitality 
 
Translation is an art, a practice in search of its theory: the question of the non-translatable 
hits the very heart of translation, and, although theoretically this question is unsurpassable, 
practically this abyss between our world and the foreign one is crossed. The experience of 
alterity is at the core of the experience of translation. That’s why hermeneutics, as a 
philosophical tradition, finds a central field to its reflection in this experience. In effect, on the 
one hand, translation is a practice that concerns principally the level of language; on the other 
hand, language cannot be understood as a simple medium to communicate one another, but as 
the way the world reveals to a community (the bond that ties language with world, with 
Lebenswelt, is a fundamental postulate of hermeneutics); finally, translation underlines the 
double-fact, the paradox, of the diversity and the unity of language (and therefore, of the world 
itself), and the necessity of a mediator, of a bridge that communicates the incommunicable. 
With all his complexity, the mythic symbol of Hermes invites us to think, and the question of 
translation and of the identity of hermeneutics are involved in one another. 
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One way to consider translation is to think about it as if it were a kind of plastic art, where 
there is a reluctant material that has to be molded in order to be understood. The form-matter 
pairing is, then, a nodal concept. This demiurgic practice would inform a chaotic material, 
giving sense to what is meaningless: while sense would play the function of form, the flesh of 
the words would play the one of matter. As we have seen, Ricoeur himself (and before him, 
Schleiermacher) report this illusion of a sense without a sign. The idealist tradition that goes all 
the way to Plato, and is still present in Husserl’s phenomenology, ignores the historic ground of 
ideas, as the bond that ties meaning to words. Hermeneutics, instead, stands upon this tension 
history-reason, language-meaning, without attempting any synthesis for these oppositions. 
Translation, then, is no plastic art, but an hermeneutical one, and its great difficulty lies on this 
impossibility to isolate meaning from words. Hermeneutics – and its figure of translation – is 
the art of constructing bridges, of bringing diverse worlds close one to another. There is a 
certain mystery in this experience of becoming an-other, and this mystery is in the heart of 
hermeneutics.
23
 
 
But hermeneutics itself not only finds in translation a central question concerning 
understanding of the strangers, but also finds the question of understanding in the community 
of language in which we are living. As Ricoeur states, translation is not only necessary 
concerning the foreign, but also appears to be urgent inside our reign’s walls:24 on the one hand, 
we can say the same things using other words; on the other hand, every dialogue implies two 
interlocutors, behalf of their condition of strangers or fellowmen, and many times there is a 
lack of understanding concerning the words we use, even if we share the same language. 
Beautifully said by Ricoeur: “Il y a de l’étranger dans tout autre”.25 Another paradox of 
language, that hermeneutics should underline, is that language communicates us at the same 
time that isolates us; words are at the same time the source of every understanding, and the 
cause of every misunderstanding. And we find here a statement, already noticed, that Ricoeur 
does not develop in his work, but that should be a central question: my own language, when 
confronted with others, appears as being foreign.
26
 But, while Ricoeur understands this foreign 
condition in a comparative way (that is to say, as being foreign to foreign), this statement should 
be understood in its own: my own mother-tongue is itself a stranger to me. Jacques Derrida 
could help us to deepen this paradoxical truth: we don’t own our own language.27 This 
paradoxical truth can be trace, also, in Heidegger’s die Sprache spricht. Alterity is in the core of 
our identity, and language is but one of the elements of our Self as an-Other. However, this 
alterity is not absolute, as far as we can appropriate language as we speak it, and moreover, we 
can open new fields of meaning and words inside language itself. Hermeneutics is here, again, 
central to understand this tension between a dead language, and language in its dynamic and 
living aspect: there’s no meaning without an intention to signify, that is, there is no meaning in 
language as an objective and independent system, but only when a dialogue happens, only 
when I want to say something to another.  
 
This also underlines another tension, the one between tradition and innovation: there’s 
no possible creation without a ground from where to jump, and there is no tradition without its 
living transformations and new significances (a closed tradition is only an abstract idea: if it were 
closed, then we could not speak about it, for speaking is already a way to open meaning). Here 
we can find again Schleiermacher’s distinction between arts and science, and commercial 
languages: both artists and scientists expand language itself in their creative activities. Although 
we have nuanced this difference, it is true that some linguistic activities impact on language 
deeper than others, and that the difficulties concerning translation appears mostly in these 
works. Schleiermacher uses a double figure that also concerns the paradox of mother-tongue as 
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foreign: in every artistic or scientific work (although we should say in every work, period) there 
is a marriage between a personal/spiritual principle and an impersonal/traditional one. 
Whereas the personal spirit of a writer plays the role of the mother, the mother-tongue (the 
difficulties of translation in action!) plays the one of the father: the work that is generated from 
this relation, then, reveals at the same time the traditional element and the innovative one, the 
impersonal and the personal, the strangeness of language and its appropriation. With this 
figure, Schleiermacher intends to show that meaning and sign are inseparable, for a new-born 
could not be the same if the father changed, as a text could not be the same if the author wrote 
it in German or in Greek.
28
   
 
This living aspect of language, that arose the question of translatability inside our 
language, is also a key access to the question of the Other, for there could not be an entirely 
new expression that wouldn’t take root in tradition: this means that there is not an absolute 
Other that could appear, but there is always a common ground from where expressions and 
meanings can blossom. But there is more: if translation happens inside our own language, and 
can only happen if there is a grounding horizon of sense – using Gadamer’s image – then 
translation concerning foreign cultures would also imply a common ground where to meet. 
The image of horizon in itself concerns not only the notion of amplitude and of surrounding, 
but also the notion of frontier. This notion could show that, at the one hand, horizon is 
essentially dynamic, that changes as much as we move, so the frontier is in itself unreachable;
29
 
but on the other hand, a frontier is, in itself, already a fusion, for in it two heterogeneous 
elements (the earth and the sky, our side and the other-side) are in contact. And if the frontier 
is a certain cut, it is, with no doubt, a possible one, not a necessary one; the frontier is the zone 
of indecidibilité, a zone that is neither one thing nor the other, but where a fusion has merged. 
To be at the frontier is already to be crossing it. No other-side is absolutely other, or absolutely 
foreign. To speak of fusion of horizons (Gadamer) could misunderstand the key question of 
the Other, for it underlines the diversity of horizons of sense that could come together in 
dialogue, but does not point out the grounding community of divers worldly experiences, a 
transcendental community that would play the role of a condition of possibility of encounter 
and dialogue. Perhaps, the question of the Lebenswelt arises here as a central one, and we 
could find in Husserl’s writing a touchstone to paradox of the unity and diversity of the world, 
as for the articulation between horizonticity and horizons.
30
 In a way, we could say that we are 
already in dialogue, and that the art of translation is a way of reassuming this forgotten 
community (maybe, as an effort of reaching the lost understanding after Babel’s Tower).31  
 
Translation, then, is only possible in the encounter between the Self and the Other, 
between our Reign and the Foreign. Translation is not at the origin of community, for, if that 
was the case, then an understanding would be impossible; nor community is at the origin of 
translation. There seems to be a community before community, that makes possible an 
encounter, and that encounter makes real or effective. We lack the words to refer to this 
community, and using Aristotelian ontological notions as potency and act to describe a passage 
from a potential community to an actual community seems to be misleading. Gabriel Marcel 
used the notion of nostrité or usness to refer to this metaphysical grounding essence of men.
32
 
Perhaps we could try to understand this essential co-esse of men from a transcendental point of 
view, or as an existentiary. I don’t know... But this primary communauté lead the way to the 
understanding of the encounter between foreign, between alterities – and translation is a central 
experience to deepen this mystery. Hermeneutics itself is grounded in this transcendental 
community that beholds inter-subjetctivity: an understanding, a communion in language, is 
always possible, although a plethoric communion is only an idea, an utopia that must be 
pursued. However, this communion in its transcendentality is not enough to bring together two 
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strangers, nor language in itself can build a bridge towards foreign cultures: hermeneutics is not 
only a philosophy of community, but also an ethical philosophy, since communion is only 
granted in praxis. This ethical dimension of hermeneutics is underlined in Ricoeur’s 
considerations on “linguistical hospitality” referred to translation:33 ultimately, to translate is an 
ethical act, not an instrumental one, for in translation we receive an-other as an Other, and we 
give our-selves as others to an-Other. We have remarked the difficulties that the experience of 
hospitality brings forward; however, what we must emphatically reassure here is that there will 
be translation only where there’s a good will, an unconditioned willing to attend the Other, a 
categorical imperative to make justice to the Foreign. We could say, even – and following the 
Kantian path – that hermeneutics, as far as it is concerned on communion, is also a political 
philosophy of peace, far from any attempt of totalitarianism: where an Oher is recognized, 
there will be hermeneutics. In this sense, to postulate an in-translatable could mean to get rid of 
ethical imperatives, for the Other is no longer Other for me, and, under the disguise of 
tolerance, an absolute in-difference can be hidden. To postulate an in-translatable is to simply 
ignore the exigency of communion. 
 
Translation, then, is a certain response to a transcendental call: the exigency of 
communion.
34
 Responsibility is at the core of translation, and therefore Hermeneutics is 
essentially an ethical philosophy. However, most of the time, translation is seen as a 
methodical, instrumental activity to communicate strangers, something that can be studied and 
can be learned, with its rules and steps. In other words, translation is considered in its scientific 
meaning. Nevertheless, we could think that there is a certain concealment of its original sense 
in this viewpoint: as Husserl spoke of a Substruktion to explain how the geometrical world of 
science concealed the Life-World as far as it presented as its Ground, we could think that to 
consider translation as science as the ground for any experience of translation is also guilty of a 
Substruktion, that is to say, of presenting the order of foundation upside down. The experience 
of translation, as we have seen, is already present in our daily life, every time we walk into 
someone else, every time we speak with ourselves as another. Translation is not a scientific 
experience, but a life experience, and that’s why translation is also present in affection: 
Schleiermacher said that the real finality of translation is the joy (Genuss) of foreign works.
35
 
Translation is the path to le plaisir de l’autre... heureux de faire votre connaissance.  
 
We must, in the concluding paragraph, however, unveil the everlasting shadow behind 
hermeneutics and translation: a mediation is not possible. Although we could think of the 
translator as a certain mediateur
36
 between the writer and the reader, the translator himself is, 
first of all, a stranger towards his own language (as we already said), and secondly, serves only 
one master, his own world, his own language. Hermeneutically speaking, every man is engaged 
with his own world-language: one could know another language as a first language, but it is only 
a way of speaking, and the comparative “as if” reveals the impossibility of being a citizen of two 
different worlds. The very notion of mediateur is compromised: there’s not such an 
impersonal, unaffected subject, that could mediate between two parts. Mediation is already an 
impossible act that is, nevertheless, under the imperative of Justice. We can’t be a mediateur, 
although we are asked to be one unconditionally. Hermes also stands for the burglars, and 
translators are really one of them: when we translate, we serve a master, and we steel from the 
other. There is no way to transcend this self-interest. Hermeneutics, then, affront its 
impossibility to achieve community, to achieve peace... but only in that impossibility is that 
hermeneutics can gain its authenticity, for impossible is – unconditionally – the unreachable 
lighthouse we must pursue in order to rest being human.  
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